Many of the federal staff were hired for the production mission. In 1995 they were asked to accept a new challenge, retrain for the cleanup mission, and achieve this in a dynamic environment with future employment uncertainty. They worked diligently to assure safety, bust bureaucratic and technological barriers, and redefine the standard of what a government organization can accomplish in the public interest.
INTRODUCTION

The role of the Federal workforce is perhaps the single most overlooked success story within the broader story of Rocky Flats. Federal workers zealously working themselves out of a job is unusual, if not unprecedented. Not unlike the trades and steelworkers, the federal staff was by and large hired for the production mission. Most hiring occurred prior to formal transition to the cleanup mission. Employees were poised for resumption of production. Consequently, the closure mission was not immediately embraced by many of the field office staff, and was never fully embraced by all federal staff. But a substantial number of federal employees did redirect their energies toward the cleanup mission, defined the project scope, negotiated a contract, reviewed and approved a baseline, provided required government furnished services and equipment, and provided oversight of budget and safety.

Rocky Flats was an area office through 1989, reporting to the Albuquerque Operations Office. Following the 1989 FBI raid, in 1990 it became the Rocky Flats Office, then soon after the Rocky Flats Field Office (RFFO). Finally in 2004 it became the Rocky Flats Project Office (RFPO) signaling alignment with closure project completion. In 1995 RFFO hired its first closure contractor. So in the matter of a few short years, the federal workforce transitioned from being at its peak staffing level (federal employees and support contractors), preparing for resumption of long-term production mission, to having a closure mission with the goal of achieving safe and compliant cleanup in the shortest amount of time. There was uncertainty regarding the specific role of the feds and skepticism about the ability of the Site to close on such an accelerated schedule. Beginning in 1997, with EM-wide restrictions on new hiring, federal staffing levels were consistently reduced using attrition. Many of the federal employees were anxious at best and disgruntled at worst, having gone through several reorganizations and uncertain of their role with the cost-plus incentive fee contract.

With strong and creative leadership, good management and good fortune, the federal workforce did persevere in providing unprecedented timely delivery of its Government-Furnished Equipment and Items (GFS&I) items and meeting its responsibilities as defined by the terms of the closure contract. As late as 1995, the Baseline Environmental Management Report (BEMR) forecasted that the remaining cleanup work at Rocky Flats would take seventy years. Later that same year, the challenge was to close by 2010. In 1996 the challenge was revised to become the ten-year plan with a 2006 closure date. And around 2002 it became apparent that a 2005 closure was potentially achievable.

The challenge for RFFO was to retrain the Federal workforce for the cleanup mission, define a new relationship whereby the feds were managing a contract not a contractor, and motivate them to work themselves out of a job.
The challenge for RFFO was to retain and retrain the federal workforce for the cleanup mission, define a new relationship whereby the feds were managing a contract not a contractor, and motivate them to work themselves out of a job. Several creative and controversial approaches were used, some more successful than others, to meet this challenge.

**Figure 14-1, Rocky Flats Federal Staffing Levels**

- **a** Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management subsequently renamed the Office of Environmental Management.
- **c** Involuntary separation of RFPO employees 1/7/2006.
- **d** 25 closure cadre positions were identified. 17 were eventually filled.
- **e** All staffing funded by Environmental Management from 1997 through closure.

**DISCUSSION**

“The Draft”

On the heels of awarding its first environmental cleanup contract to Kaiser-Hill, RFFO reorganized. To implement a re-organization of the RFFO coincident with the implementation of the new management and
integrating contract, the office held a “draft” in 1995. This “draft,” so named because it had similarities to a sports draft process, was a significant emotional event for Federal employees. The concept behind the draft was to create a radical change in behavior by the Federal employees. The RFFO Manager believed that the entire organization, from senior managers to staff, were largely focusing on their own issues, doing little to cooperate across the organization and adjust to the new roles demanded by the new contract structure. The draft allowed for a massive and nearly instantaneous re-assignment of RFFO personnel to other jobs within different RFFO organizations. Jobs requiring specific qualifications such as attorneys were off limits. All other jobs were open for re-assignment. Individuals provided their top three job choices. Some organizations participated in a pseudo-recruitment fair to explain what functions their new organizations were going to perform and recruit desired staff. After everyone had identified their choices, managers met several times to decide where staff would be re-assigned. During these management meetings to re-assign personnel, employee representatives were present to ensure that diversity goals were addressed and that re-assignments were not subjective. In virtually all cases, management placed the staff into one of their 3 choices. The draft achieved the radical change the Manager desired. However, a detrimental outcome of the reorganization was that some staff went into positions with little or no familiarity with the position’s requirements. In some instances technical staff were re-assigned into administrative positions. Grade mismatches and certain assignments created widespread resentment and suspicions about the validity of the process and management’s intent. The level of upheaval created by the draft allowed for very rapid culture change within the RFFO, not unlike a Marine boot camp experience. However, it also created numerous challenges that lingered for many years.

Within a year of the new performance-based incentive closure contract, and in the aftermath of the draft, there was a recognition within RFFO both that change really was occurring and that a more fundamental change still needed to take place if the RFFO was to be successful in its new mission. Alignment to the closure mission would need much more than a change to the lines and boxes of the RFFO organization chart. Even though the vision and mission clearly identified an accelerated closure project, RFFO behaviors largely reflected business as usual. Assistant Managers were competitive rather than cooperative with one another. Managers and staff continued to manage the contractor instead of using the contract as the basis for interaction with Kaiser-Hill (the contractor also exhibited this behavior). In short, the notion of a completion project, and the opportunity for great achievement, had not been internalized within the RFFO.

Even though there was a new mission, a new contractor, and a new contract, Assistant Managers were competitive versus cooperative with one another.
A second significant change occurred in 1996 when the Rocky Flats Manager rescinded all Contracting Officer Representative (COR) delegations and then redelegated the authority to only a handful of managers. Up until that time, the informal practice allowed any federal staff member to provide technical direction to the contractor both in terms of what work should be performed and more importantly how it should be performed. The substantial reduction in the number of CORs and the emphasis on using formal contracting mechanisms provided notice to the feds that business would only be conducted through the Contracting Officer and the CORs, and in accordance with the contract with zero tolerance for unauthorized technical direction to the contractor. Use of a disciplinary letter to an SES Assistant Manager who violated the new policy made clear that RFFO would be managing to a specified scope, and that the old informal “M&O behaviors” had to cease. This had a profound impact on the federal staff, many of whom associated their own value added with being able to provide direction to the contractor. It also served as a catalyst for discussions regarding the new federal oversight role.

Management Alignment Process

The next significant emotional event was the Management Alignment Process (MAPping). While considerable resources were applied to phasing out the management and operating (M&O) contractor in favor of an integrating management contractor, encouraging competition from world-class contractors not traditionally involved in performing DOE work, and designing improved contractor performance incentives, there was not a similarly rigorous complex-wide review of the federal organizations responsible for overseeing its contractors (either in the field or at Headquarters). The RFFO as it existed in 1995 exhibited old behaviors. The Site had a new mission, a new contractor and new performance expectations as a pilot cleanup site, but had not internalized these expectations to achieve recognition that the field office, too, would need to reinvent itself. Even with the drastic reorganization and change in COR authorities, additional changes were needed to align with the closure mission and new contract structure.

During 1997 the RFFO management team entered into the Management Alignment Process. It was a comprehensive exercise of identifying all functions of the federal staff and their associated processes. Senior managers were sequestered for days at a time and thousands of man-hours were expended over the course of about nine months, discussing and analyzing the mission and functions of the federal workforce. Federal functions were defined and proceduralized. Unnecessary functions were...
eliminated. The processes were compiled into a handbook and the handbook was placed upon a shelf. Consequently, there was a great deal of cynicism about MAPping, some of it justified.

However, the subtler goal of this process was to force the senior managers to work together and to exhibit corporate behavior. The extraordinary time commitment and shared effort of working through the MAPping process, the subsequent involvement of staff in the process, and the development of the handbook all signaled a change in how business would be conducted within the RFFO. Although the MAPping Handbook did not ultimately serve as the daily desk reference it was intended to become, overall, the MAPping process was successful in that it achieved its goal of breaking old behaviors. It was inefficient, however, and was essentially a surrogate for a strategic planning process - setting corporate expectations and holding employees (managers and staff) accountable for their performance.

Another weakness stemmed from the fact that the Management Alignment Process developed systems but did not develop employees. In part, the process was aligned to the previous mission. The cohesive link to the new contract, new mission, and new role for the feds had not been completely established and reinforced through training. Thus a certain “trial and error” approach was evident throughout the RFFO as managers and staff tried to implement the MAPping imperatives. What was emphasized, however, was that the old way of doing business was not going to cut it. So MAPping represented another important step in the continuum of activities aimed at redefining the DOE role and expected behaviors. The procedures and handbook were not the end product, they were a means to an end.

The goal of the process was to affect cultural change. This effort laid the groundwork for what was to follow – accountability for delivery of GFS&I and development and adherence to a federal baseline. Looking back at MAPping it succeeded in establishing the organizational teamwork and cooperation template necessary to support the future Closure Contract and GFS&I delivery challenges. Those managers and staff that embraced the closure mission and internalized the need to exhibit corporate behavior generally enjoyed the most success as the RFFO continued to adapt to the Closure Contract in 2000. Those managers and staff not embracing the changes struggled as the environment continued to change and move toward closure, many choosing to seek other employment rather than change. In the end, the process was less about the development of work processes, and more about challenging the status quo. The federal managers needed to learn how to work more as a team and less as competitors.
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Developing a Federal Baseline

For all the criticism of MAPping, it was largely successful in qualitatively describing the organizational and staff roles, responsibilities and functions for the DOE to support the closure mission. The next important step was to quantify the same information. This was achieved in 1999 through completion of the first RFFO federal baseline, or life-cycle baseline (LCB) as it was called at the time. The development of the LCB for RFFO was a completely new system within RFFO and within the DOE. The LCB organized and documented the entire Federal work scope and resource requirements in support of the overall Site closure project. The RFFO LCB documented the functions of all RFFO staff, applying number of hours each year to each task by individual, and allowed a total closure project baseline that included both the Federal and Contractor elements described and justified at a similar level of detail. The benefits provided by the LCB include a more consistent and objective justification for Federal costs, a more defensible Federal component of the overall closure project cost, a means to objectively measure performance and push for improvement, and a mechanism to increase the accountability of Federal managers for performance against a baseline.

Although the program management benefits were clear, development of the LCB was difficult and controversial. Quantifying time spent on oversight of contractor activities, or in coordination meetings, to the detail of hours per week was an estimate at best. No database or examples existed for reference or comparison. Also, the declining budget posture caused rumors of a reduction-in-force (RIF) to begin circulating in 1997, making many employees believe that the LCB exercise was merely a ploy to document the elimination of their position. In response, the bottoms-up LCB time estimates tended to be significantly inflated, most employees showing that 1.2 to 1.5 people were required to accomplish their existing scope of work. Despite these problems the LCB provided a starting point for quantitatively defining the RFFO contribution to the Site closure mission. More importantly, it clarified for RFFO staff and management the tasks of each individual and organization, as well as the interplay between the DOE and the contractor. This shared understanding would later serve the DOE under the 2000 Closure Contract when RFFO would be required by contract to deliver GFS&I against strict milestones.

A federal baseline has already materialized at other DOE sites, and is now a required element of site baseline development for Environmental Management. While it can and will continue to be refined, it represents two important principles: the DOE is responsible for delivering product on
a schedule (e.g. GFS&I), and the DOE has functions unique from those of the contractor which can be quantified and managed.

Functional Analysis of Federal Staffing

Most RFFO staff were hired prior to 1995, when the concept of a 2006 closure had not been developed. DOE was not staffed for oversight of an environmental cleanup project. With an integrating contractor, a performance-based contract and only a handful of contracting officer representatives, RFFO had far too many staff performing work associated with the previous mission or with an M&O type contract, and was not focused on closure of the Site. As closure project planning started to reflect an earlier forecasted completion, indications of eventual reductions in RFFO staffing levels began to appear. The implementation of a closure contract with a December 2006 completion date provided the impetus to begin substantial federal workforce planning. Initial efforts in 2000 – 2001 built on the data collected from the LCB process and focused on identifying the skills required to fulfill the RFFO mission. This effort was a good first step, but was limited by the same “inflation” of duties and hours, which skewed the staffing projects beyond what management considered reasonable.

The next workforce planning effort in mid-2002 shifted to specific functional needs, with a more direct linkage to the closure project and its timeline. Specifically this effort attempted to align with the DOE functions and skills needed to support the Closure Contract and complete the Site closure mission. Environmental Management provided an independent review in fall 2002 of the Federal workforce planning at the request of the RFFO Manager. The review generally affirmed the planning efforts, but made multiple recommendations for advancing the strategy and processes for the eventual downsizing and worker transition.

The Function and Position Analyses (FPA) completed in February 2003 and updated in July 2003 was a result of the EM review and took the RFFO staffing level planning to the next steps, including specific positions aligned with organizational functions. The FPA also reflected a more accelerated timeline for RFFO reductions based on current and anticipated project performance, acceptance of management risk, and other factors. It also took the very controversial step of reflecting when, by quarter, each individual position was no longer needed, including the name of the incumbent in the position. Employees now had the first document that showed their job being eliminated and when. In general, the backlash many feared would occur from release of this information did not occur. Employees were thankful to finally have definitive information upon which to plan their future career, and although still personally difficult, it
pushed RFFO management toward efforts to support the worker transitions in the most effective and humane way possible. The final update to the FPA, completed in November 2004, assumed a physical completion date in October 2005, 15 months earlier than in the initial analysis, and anticipated support from the Consolidated Business Center in June 2005. Along with more accurately linking workforce planning to the overall project performance expectations, it also effectively removed the last elements of doubt about the ultimate requirement for all the EM staff to transition.

**Reduction-in-Force**

To this point the Federal Workforce section has reviewed deliberate planning and management actions to support the closure mission. However, several more general issues existed as a backdrop during the same time period. In early 1997 rumors circulated that RFFO would be running a Reduction-in-Force (RIF) to reduce the size of the federal workforce that had been staffed for a different mission. The prospect of a RIF was hanging over the heads of the federal employees for nearly a year during the same timeframe as the LCB and workforce planning efforts. Together they had a demoralizing effect on the staff. The formal announcement of RIF planning in summer of 1997 driven by budget limitations did have another affect though; it accelerated attrition. Faced with uncertainty of employment, and as yet, unclear responsibilities vis-a-vis the contractor, employees left Rocky Flats at an unprecedented rate. No RIF took place in 1997 or 1998 as many employees feared, but from that point forward an eventual RIF was always on employees’ minds.

During 2003 the RFFO did initiate a RIF with an actual involuntary separation date of January 10, 2004. The RIF was announced with some certitude many months in advance of mandated timeframes, enabling staff ample time to pursue other government or private sector jobs. Once again the RIF served as a catalyst for employee transition. After having the specter of a RIF looming for nearly six years, most staff receiving RIF notices were visibly relieved to have the certainty of the separation notice and date. They knew it was coming, and many had already planned for it. By actually handing out the RIF notices, it enabled staff to move forward. Management actively supported employee transition to allow buyouts and support placement as described further below. As a consequence, 101 positions were eliminated, but only 20 employees required involuntary separation. An assessment completed in August 2004 documented the more detailed lessons learned from the RIF.

A second and final RIF was conducted during 2005 with separation at the beginning of 2006. It was essentially the mechanism for closing the
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project office following physical completion of the cleanup, with remaining employees reporting to the Environmental Management Consolidated Business Center (CBC) or to Legacy Management. All RFPO positions were eliminated and thus the typical “bump and retreat” issues within the RIF were moot. Employees had similar success in receiving buyouts or placement, such that only five employees were involuntarily separated, and all but one of those had civilian job opportunities available.

Federal Employee Union

During 1998, the DOE staff unionized as Local 1103 of the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE). The union activism was certainly in response to the change in mission, the definition of a project (and employment) endpoint, and also in response to the 1997 RIF planning. Although the union had no significant impact on the closure mission, it did consume management’s time. Some staff joined the Union because they had been disenfranchised from the DOE mission and the processes (MAPping, LCB, etc.) that RFFO used to advance the mission.

The process for forming a bargaining unit, and its subsequent implementation, was a vehicle for a segment of the workforce to seek justice or retribution for perceived past management mistreatment going all the way back to “the draft”. The approval of the Union and formation of the bargaining unit created a division between employees at a time when the organization needed to mature and develop better working relationships. For example, union representatives attended many routine team meetings and staff meetings, and created an adversarial “us and them” environment. At a time when the closure mission was already driving many changes through the RFFO workforce, the Union added another level of turbulence.

For much of the time that the local AFGE existed at Rocky Flats, management was reactionary. Management was inexperienced with labor relations issues when labor began to organize, and then once a bargaining unit existed, management struggled to provide sufficient priority to develop a productive relationship with the union with all the other competing priorities. Employees received better and more consistent benefits due to the Union, as the Collective Bargaining Agreement provided for many staff desires including such items as alternate work schedules, performance awards, office space assignments, and training opportunities.

In general RFFO management and the Union leaders were never able to forge a truly productive partnership to provide much real benefit to the RFFO mission.

In general RFFO management and the Union leaders were never able to forge a truly productive partnership to provide much real benefit to the
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RFFO mission. Two AFGE initiatives stand out as exceptions for their future impact on closure and transition. The first was the use of a “Pass / Fail” performance measurement system. Management agreed to this proposal, but wanted to provide some feedback to the employees. A Multiple Appraiser Rating System (MARS) was developed and refined several times to provide narrative feedback from supervisors, subordinates, and peers. The MARS was cumbersome to manage and ended up taking longer to complete than the previous multi-tier numeric rating systems, such that eventually its use was stopped. However, in the several years it was used the understanding of peer and team member tasks and contributions increased substantially. The teamwork and cooperation between organizations within the office made lasting improvements to RFFO performance, especially when future downsizing required remaining staff to perform multiple jobs. The most significant problem with the pass/fail evaluations would not be understood until much later when employees tried to compete for jobs in other Federal agencies. Employees found that a “Pass” was not very inspiring to a prospective employer, and anecdotal evidence suggests several employees missed placement opportunities because of use of the pass/fail system.

The second AFGE initiative was an active involvement in the RIF planning process. The Union was essentially “born” because of 1997 RIF rumors, so it was always a priority interest. When the project was clearly finishing and the RIF a certainty in 2003, AFGE demanded to be involved. Through negotiation, the final RIF separation date was extended several months, the window for buyouts was extended, and several other placement initiatives increased. However, in exchange the Union largely supported the RIF and despite elimination of over 100 positions, only one Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) challenge was submitted, and that one was subsequently dismissed as without merit.

Worker Transition

Beginning in 2003, as 2006 closure began to look more likely, management aggressively pursued transition opportunities for federal staff using formal and informal means. The primary purpose was to avoid involuntary separations during a RIF if at all possible, however it was also believed that improved placement would help overall morale of the office and allow better focus on job tasks. The RFFO Manager and senior managers actively “marketed” RFFO employees through the Denver Federal Executive Board, and one-on-one discussions with executives from area federal agencies. With many federal agencies maintaining regional offices in the Denver area, transition opportunities existed that do not exist at many other DOE field offices. One of the most successful
arrangements was the placement of about twenty RFFO employees with the Golden Field Office. Other RFFO employees were hired at Denver offices of the Forest Service, US Geologic Survey, Minerals Management Service, Veterans Affairs and the Environmental Protection Agency. These placements were facilitated by use of extended details for RFFO employees to a target agency. Development of worker transition plans revealed that almost all of the priority placement benefits for an employee undergoing a RIF are voluntary for the hiring agency, or can be circumvented. The detail approach was used to allow employees to get into the target employer’s office, become known, and hopefully make themselves invaluable, so that the agency would want to hire them. They would be more than just a name on a re-employment priority list. The salary continued to be paid by the DOE, essentially providing a free trial period. The use of details in this manner resulted in a greater than 80% placement rate.

**Closure Cadre**

Another new approach for workforce planning was developed during 2003, the concept of a core cadre. The intent was for key people from the federal workforce with closure site experience, to serve as corporate resources, administratively reporting to Headquarters, and applying their closure project experiences to other sites when they were no longer needed at Rocky Flats. This would have the dual benefit of applying lessons learned via direct staff interaction, and providing a stable career path for a limited number of people who might otherwise be subject to RIF. Retention of experienced people was important, but equally important was retaining them as a critical mass to perpetuate the closure culture at other DOE sites.

Management was concerned about having sufficient technical expertise available to ensure proper oversight and capabilities to support the completion of Site closure. The concern, that too many RFFO employees would find other jobs (too soon) and leave, resulting in an insufficient number of employees to support closing Rocky Flats, was never realized partly because of the cadre, although the skill mix of the federal staff became more important as staff size diminished.

Toward the end of the project “Closure Cadre” personnel were networked with other DOE sites to facilitate reassignments. A human relations team was assembled at Headquarters, sent to collect information on “Closure Cadre” staff preferences. Unfortunately, the transition to a new administration at Headquarters and the formation of the CBC resulted in transition of Closure Cadre personnel being put on the back burner. The logistical preparation to implement the “mobility agreement,” a condition
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of employment for “Closure Cadre” employees, was inadequate. There was no standardized process for identifying opportunities, placing Closure Cadre personnel, or implementing a permanent change of station. Even though all cadre members were required to sign a mobility agreement as a condition for selection to the closure cadre, the Department was unprepared with processes or budget to implement the mobility agreements. The impression given to the “Closure Cadre” employees was that in exchange for their commitment to relocate, all relocation benefits (i.e., guaranteed home purchase, real estate expenses, etc.) would be provided. In practice each Cadre placement has been unique, and there remains considerable confusion regarding the policies associated with closure cadre relocations.

The ten-year history of the RFFO office and other members of the Federal workforce that supported Rocky Flats closure reveals an interesting story. The RFFO was staffed for a job very different from Site closure. The office experienced substantial changes, some instituted by management (e.g., MAPping, Federal baseline) and others management would have preferred to avoid (e.g., unionization), which impacts the structure, operations, and morale of the workforce. Each of these changes, whether viewed as positive or negative at the time, served to increase the mission focus, understanding of fellow worker contributions, and overall sense of teamwork. This evolution of the workforce character and values was well suited to the challenges of the closure contract, and the strict requirements to provide GFS&I. Although it took several years to develop, the Federal workforce reached the point of working proactively and cooperatively with contractors, regulators, stakeholders, and other DOE and Federal offices to advance the closure mission. Actively supporting the actions necessary to advance closure, while maintaining a degree of independence for oversight, was a delicate balance that the Federal workforce performed well and therefore became important to the overall success of the closure.

**KEY LEARNING POINTS**

1. Build a complete Federal baseline that clearly identifies the tasks, schedules, and necessary skills for the mission.

2. Align the staff with the new mission immediately. Publishing the functional and skills needs, with as much information as is allowable, will assist transition and morale.

3. Directly linking federal workforce staffing to project baseline milestones increases awareness and accountability, and must be communicated to employees.
4. Be creative and consistent in supporting staff to perform. Reward their efforts and support their placement when the mission ends. Develop and implement retention and transition tools to manage attrition, using creative techniques to match the situation and need.

5. A RIF is difficult and challenging for management and the workforce, but can be managed to have minimal impact on productivity and morale.

6. Treat a federal union as any other key stakeholder group, seeking to build trust, understanding, and collaborative relationships. Union initiatives require substantial management attention, but can be supportive of the mission.

7. Culture change to support a new site mission or major baseline change is very difficult. Radical organizational change can be made, but brings with it substantial morale and workforce issues.

8. The Federal workforce can provide substantial support to the closure mission and contribute significantly to its success depending on how they are organized, managed, and led.
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