Title: Safeguards and Security at a Closure Site

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Lessons Learned Statement: An adequate turnover of the security program to and the proper training of the federal personnel responsible for the security program.

Discussion of Activities: Mr. Casey, Director of RFPO Safeguards and Security, assumed all roles and responsibilities of the RFPO Safeguards and Security (S&S) program in January 2004. As a result of a Site Reduction In Force (RIF), at that time the S&S staff was reduced from 8 FTEs to 1, Mr. Casey being the 1 FTE. Mr. Casey assumed responsibility of the five S&S topical areas; Personnel Security, Information Security, Material Control and Accountability (MC&A), Program Management, and Protection Program Operations. Mr. Casey did not receive adequate training prior to assuming this singular position although the National Training Center (NTC) does offer some training that could have been beneficial.

The transition was made more difficult by the fact that many of those leaving as a result of the RIF had left their files in boxes and provided little or no status as to their respective programs. The S&S Director was left to rely upon the contractor to implement, administer, and maintain the required security programs while he assumed the role of oversight. Additionally, he was assigned responsibility for administering the Violence in the Work Place program, the Quality Assurance program and other duties as assigned. He did not have sufficient time to adequately oversee the various security programs.

Mr. Casey offered that there was no contingency plan should he be unable to perform the S&S duties. However, he also noted that he had received adequate support from EM-3.1 (HQ) and felt that HQ could have assisted the Site if needed. He also pointed out that HQ had in turn recognized and called upon additional support from other EM field sites in past for support and could have turned to that source for assistance in an emergency situation.

Analysis (May be incorporated into the Discussion): Future EM closure sites should avoid assigning additional duties to the S&S Director. The person is identified early on so as to allow time for sufficient training in all five S&S disciplines. A procedure/process is developed to transition all security programs, and custodians of enduring security programs should be identified as early as possible to ensure a timely and adequate transfer of those program roles and responsibilities as well as documentation.
Recommended Actions:

Estimated Savings/Cost Avoidance (if applicable):

Originator: Brian Gladstone

Keywords: Safeguards, Security, personnel